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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
) 
ACCULOG, INC., a State of 
Colorado corporation, ROBERT 
PFISTER and KENTON SHAW, 
co-partners doing business 
under the firm name and style ) 
of ACCULOG FIELD SERVICES, 
) 
) 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
KEITH PETERSON, dba, 
PETERSON FORD, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. 18133 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action to recover damages resulting from a 
fire to the Plaintiffs' geophysical logging unit, the fire having 
occurred following repairs performed by the Defendant. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried before a jury with the Honorable George 
E. Ballif presiding. The court directed a verdict against the 
Plaintiffs on the issue of loss of profits. The jury apportioned 
negligence 86% to the Plaintiffs and 14% to the Defendant causing 
the Plaintiffs to be nonsui ted on their claim for damages for the 
total loss of their geophysical logging unit. The verdict was 
rendered on September 23, 1981. Judgment in the case was entered 
-1-
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on October 28, 1981, following the Court's denial of the Plain-
tiffs' motion for a new trial which was filed on September 30, 1981 
The Plaintiffs' notice of appeal was filed on November 16, 1981. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Appellants request that the judgment be reversed and 
that the case be remanded with orders: 
(1) That the District Court direct a verdict in favor of 
the Appellants on the issue of comparative negligence 
and enter a judgment for the stipulated amount of dam-
ages to the Plaintiffs' logging unit, and 
(2) That the Plaintiffs' be granted a new trial on the 
issues of loss of profits and non-stipulated damages 
attributable to the loss of the Plaintiff's van and 
logging unit. 
In the alternative, the Appellants request that the judgment be re-
versed and that the case be remanded for a new trial on all issues 
not stipulat~d to previously by the parties. 
FACTS 
The Plaintiffs, at all times relevant, were in the business 
of logging the presence of uranium ore and other minerals. Their 
business involved the use of several borehole logging units which 
consisted of vans equipped with complex electronic and mechanical 
equipment. 
Probing and logging for uranium is accomplished by lower-
ing a probe down a hole previously drilled by a drilling company. 
The hole typically is about six inches wide and several hundred 
feet deep. The probe, as it is lowered, senses the geophysical 
properties of the hole at the different levels. A drift survey 
of the hole is also taken to show how much the hole deviates from 
-2-
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being perfectly vertical (Pretrial Order, T. 26-27). 
VAN LEASED AND LOGGING UNIT PURCHASED 
On or about March 18, 1979, the Plaintiffs leased a 1977 
four wheel drive Ford E250 quadravan for the purpose of installing 
a bore-hole logging unit. A Mount Sopris logging unit was pur-
chased and installed in the van on or about May 20, 1979. Be-
tween the date of acquisition and the date the logging unit was 
installed in the van, the van was driven about 200 miles by the 
Plaintiffs and the Plaintiffs encountered no problems relating 
to the operation of the van (T. 196-197). 
The van and logging unit were put to work during the first 
week in June, 1979, on a logging job for URADCO near LaSal Junc-
tion in San Juan County, Utah (T. 26). Use of the van and logging 
unit on the URADCO job consisted of driving the van from Moab to 
LaSal Junction for about 20 miles on a paved highway, then driving 
about five miles on dirt or gravel roads. The van would then 
travel from drill hole to drill hole where the Plaintiff would log 
for the presence of uranium (T. 27). The terrain on the URADCO 
job required use of four wheel drive on rare occasions (Tr. 28). 
VAN OVERHEATS AND "CUTS OUT" 
No servicing of the van occurred following the purchase of 
the van until June 28, 1979. On that date the van was taken to 
the Defendant's garage in Moab, Utah because it had been inter-
mittently "cutting out" and overheating (T. 28). Mr. Jim Gates, 
one of the Plaintiffs' employees who operated the van and logging 
unit on the URADCO job during the month of June, testified that 
the van had experienced the overheating and "cutting out" about 
four times prior to the date that the van was delivered to the 
-~-
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Defendant, and that the symptoms occurred intermittently about 
once every three or four days over a two week period. Gates tes-
tified that by "cutting out" he meant that the engine would stop 
for about "a half second" and then resume operation while the van 
was in motion. Gates testified that he had never smelled gasoline 
or heard the engine backfire prior to the date on which it was 
delivered to the Defendant (Tr. 28-30). 
Mr. Kenton Shaw, who also operated the van on the URADCO 
job with Mr. Gates, testified that the over-heating and ''cutting 
out" would happen when the van was traveling uphill whether on the 
highway or on a back road going up a steep incline (T. 72). 
VAN DELIVERED TO DEFENDANT FOR REPAIRS 
When the van was delivered to the Defendant's garage at 
about 9:30 a.m. on June 28, 1979, the Defendant's employees 
promptly diagnosed the "cutting out" to be caused by a clogged 
fuel filter (T. 74; Ex. 1). Mr. Allen Simon, the Defendant's em-
ployee, removed the fuel filter from the carburator and installed 
a new fuel filter when he found flakes of foreign matter in the 
old fuel filter (T. 240-241, 265-266). Simon testified that the 
flexible fuel line which connected the melted fuel line to the 
fuel filter had leaked gasoline when he started the engine after 
replacing the fuel filter and that he had then replaced the old 
flexible fuel line with a new fuel line. He could not recall, 
however, whether he had installed new clamps on the flexible fuel 
line (T. 240-241, 252). He testified that he put a gasket on 
the fuel filter (T. 238). Simon further testified that he con-
sidered the foreign matter in the fuel filter to be the primary 
cause of the van's problems (T. 265-266). 
-4-
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VAN AND LOGGING UNIT DESTROYED BY FIRE 
Gates and Shaw returned to the Defendant's premises at 
about noon, paid for the work performed by the Defendant's em-
ployees, and drove the van to the URADCO job site (T. 32, 36, 75). 
No problems with the van were encountered on the approximately 
25 mile trip to the job site. Once at the site the Plaintiffs' 
van was only driven "a few hundred yards" between holes during 
the day and no problems were encountered (T. 38, 81). 
Gates and Shaw finished logging holes at about 8:45 p.m. 
and started back to Moab. After traveling less than two miles 
on a down hill grade at a slow rate of speed, Gates and Shaw 
smelled gasoline coming from the direction of the engine compart-
ment. Within approximately one minute they heard a "pop" or a 
"kawoosh" sound. Shaw, who was driving, observed flames coming 
from under the front left wheel well and stopped the van. Shaw 
and Gates attempted to throw dirt on the flames underneath the 
engine and lifted the engine hood and attempted to extinguish 
the fire, which had covered most of the engine, by throwing dirt 
on the flames (T. 39-43). They were able to slow the fire but 
not to fully contain it and the flames spread into the cab of the 
van (T. 43-44). The van's engine was situated in a "really diff-
icult position" back under the hood and its inaccessability ob-
structed efforts to extinguish the fire (T. 42-43; Ex. 5). 
Despite fearing that the, van might blow up (T. 92), Shaw 
and Gates entered the van and salvaged as much loose equipment 
and property as they could. Several expensive pieces of probing 
equipment were saved, however, most of the equipment was bolted 
into the van and could not be saved (T. 43-44). The fire resulted 
-5-
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in the Plaintiffs' loss of the van valued at $7,290.00 under the 
lease, and Mount Sopris equipment with a stipulated value of at 
least $41,687.95 (Pretrial Order, pages 2-4). After the fire, 
the Plaintiffs were unable to perform two logging contracts with 
Amoco Minerals because of the loss of their unit and the Plain-
tiffs claimed damages at trial for a loss of profits of over 
$33,000.00 (T. 175-182, 209-214). 
Shaw testified that neither he nor Gates nor anyone else 
had so much as lifted the hood of the van after it was delivered 
to them by the Defendant's employees until the hood was lifted to 
extinguish the fire (T. 75-76). Both Gates and Shaw testified 
on cross examination, despite the Plaintiffs' relevancy objection, 
that the van did not have a fire extinguisher in it (T. 53, 89). 
EXPERT TESTIMONY 
The Plaintiffs called Mr. Robert J. Caldwell as an expert 
witness. Mr. Caldwell testified that he had examined the van 
after the fire and that he had also examined the fuel filter 
which had been salvaged from the van prior to his inspection of 
the van by Dr. Rudolph Limpert, the Defendant's expert. Caldwell 
testified that based upon his examination of the van and fuel 
filter, the testimony given, and Dr .. Limpert's failure to find a 
gasket with the fuel filter when he examined the engine, it was 
his opinion that the most probable cause of the fire was the 
negligent failure of the Defendant's employees to install a gas-
ket on the filter when it was screwed into the carburator. He 
testified that gasoline pumped by the fuel pump probably squirted 
out of the fuel filter threads onto the intake manifold where 
ignition occurred. He testified that the salvaged fuel filter 
-6-
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had what had been molten carburator aluminum d(~posiLs on i L~; 
threads and that since he could not get a new gasket to fiL over 
the aluminum deposits on the threads it was extremely unlikely 
that a gasket had ever been installed on the fuel filter as re-
quired. He testified that the fire was "definately a fuel system-
caused and fed fire'' and that the gasket was made of a ferrous 
material and could not have been destroyed or melted in the fire 
(T. 114-119). 
Dr. Limpert testified that, in his opinion, the fire had 
probably been caused by excessive fuel in the carburator system 
being ignited either by a backfire or by coming in contact with 
hot exhaust components (T. 299). He testified that the missing 
gasket could have "stuck" to the molten carburator when the filter 
fell out of the burning carburator and that molten aluminum could 
have then dripped onto the threads. He also testified that the 
gasket may have been pushed off of the engine prior to the time 
that he made his inspection and found the burnt filter (T. 311-312). 
He acknowledged on cross examination that another reason for his 
failure to find a gasket could be that a gasket was never installed 
in the first place (T. 330-331). Caldwell testified that it was 
unlikely that a gasket would have "stuck" to the carburator because 
it would have fit tightly on the threads of the fuel filter when 
installed (T. 119). 
DISPOSITION 
At the close of the Plaintiffs' case the court granted the 
Defendant's motion for a partial directed verdict that the Plain-
tiff had failed to prove a loss of profits (T. 233-235). The 
Plaintiffs' evidence regarding loss of profits is fully discussed 
-7-
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in Point III and the facts relating to loss of profits will there-
fore not be set forth here. 
At the close of the Defendant's case the Plaintiff moved the 
court for a directed verdict that the Defendant had failed to prove 
that the Plaintiffs were negligent or that they had contributed to 
the cause of the fire. The court denied the Defendant's motion on 
the belief that the Plaintiffs' failure to have a fire extinguisher, 
which could have been used to extinguish the fire, was a contribut-
ing cause of the fire. The court also denied a motion by the Plain-
tiffs to bar defense counsel from arguing that the Plaintiffs' fail-
ure to have a fire extinguisher constituted contributory negligence 
(T. 340-342). The Plaintiffs' failure to have a fire extinguisher 
was then argued to the jury by the Defendants (T. 394-396). The 
jury returned a special verdict finding that the Defendant had been 
negligent in servicing the Plaintiffs' van and that said negligence 
wasaproximate cause of the fire. The jury also found that the 
Plaintiffs' were negligent and that said negligence was a proximate 
cause of the fire. The jury apportioned negligence 86% to the 
Plaintiffs and 14% to the Defendant causing the Plaintiff to be 
nonsuited (T. 403). The court, thereafter, denied the Plaintiffs' 
motion for a new trial. 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR 
IN NOT GRANTING A DIRECTED VERDICT IN FAVOR 
OF THE PLAINTIFFS ON THE ISSUE OF THE PLAIN-
TIFFS COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE AND IN NOT BARR-
ING DEFENSE COUNSEL FROM ARGUING TO THE JURY 
THAT FAILURE TO HAVE A FIRE EXTINGUISHER CON-
STITUTED NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE PLAIN-
TIFFS 
During cross examination of the Plaintiffs the Defen-
dant elicited testimony over the Plaintiffs' objection to 
show that the Plaintiffs' failure to have a fire extinguisher in 
-A-
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the van constituted negligence on the part of the PldinLifl. Dur-
ing the cross examination of Jim Gates Lhe foll.owinq occurred: 
Q. Now, you testified there was some of what you 
used the words "sophisticated and expensive" 
equipment that was on the van, is that corr,ect? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you're certain there wasn't a fire extin-
guisher in the van? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did that concern you at any time while you were 
operating that van? 
MR. MORTENSEN: Objection, your Honor. I 
don't mind him answering the question, but I'm 
not sure of the relevancy of it. 
THE COURT: Overruled. He may answer. 
MR. GATES: I don't believe I was ever aware 
of one. It may have just skipped my mind. 
Q. (By Mr. Hayes) If that equipment had belonged to 
you--now, you were just an employee, is that 
correct? 
A. I had ten percent of two trucks. 
Q. Ownership? 
A. Yes. It was more or less an ownership. 
Q. You had a stake in this Acculog Field Service, is 
that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you were an owner, basically, of the operation, 
to some extent? 
A. Well, a very small part of it, yes. 
Q. And being an owner and realizing that there was 
some very sophisticated and expensive equipment on 
the van, can you tell me why a fire extinguisher 
was not kept on the van? 
A. No. (T. 53-54) 
During the Defendant's cross-examination of Kenton Shaw the 
following exchange occurred: 
-9-
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Q. You were a part owner in this business, weren't 
you? 
A. Yes, I was. 
Q. You had an interest in that van, and the contents 
of that van, isn't that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And there was expensive equipment in the van? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And I think "sophisticated" is the word that has 
been used, but.it was expensive equipment in the 
van, is that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Had you ever made any attempts to get a fire 
extinguisher for that van? 
A. Well, it was standard practice to have one in 
our vans. But it was a new van. We just hadn't 
gotten around to putting one in it yet. 
Q. You hadn't put a fire extinguisher in it yet? 
A. No. 
Q. Are you familiar with the regulations of MSHA? 
A. No, I'm not. 
Q. You have never heard of that particular term? 
A. No. 
Q. You weren't familiar with the fact, then, that 
fire extinguishers are required on that type of 
equipment? 
MR. MORTENSEN: Objection, your honor. 
THE COURT: Just a minute. For what purpose? 
MR. MORTENSEN: Your Honor, I believe that 
an advocate for the other side is testifying now, 
and I object to the question. 
THE COURT: I'll sustain the objection. 
Q. (By Mr. Hqyes) Are you aware of any regulations, 
either federal or state, that require fire ex-
tinguishers on vehicles used in mineral explora-
tion or logging, such as you were doing? 
A. No, I'm not. 
-10-
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Q. Okay. But it's your testimony at this time, 
that it's standard procedure to have fire ext.in-
guishers on this type of vehicle? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And what would be the purpose for having a fire 
extinguisher on a van like this? 
A. Just safety reasons. 
Q. You heard Mr. Gates testify that he felt like 
at one time you might have contained the fire, 
is that correct? You heard him testify as to 
that? 
A. Yes, I heard him. 
Q. Did you have the same thoughts at any time? 
A. Well, when I first saw it, I thought we could put 
it out. 
Q. Have you ever used a fire extinguisher before? 
A. No, I haven't. 
Q. Have you ever seen one used? 
A. I'm not sure if I have or not. 
Q. Is it your opinion that if you would have had a 
fire extinguisher, you would have been able to 
put that fire out, initially? 
A. It's hard to say. 
Q. But there's a pretty good chance that you could 
have, though? 
A. Yes, I think we had a chance. 
Q. And if you would have put it out at that point, 
the point that we are talking about, you would 
have just had an engine fire, is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How long did the throwing of dirt on the engine 
activity go on? How long did you throw dirt on 
the engine? 
A. Approximately five to ten minutes. 
Q. And what did you do after that time? 
A. Well, the fire started to spreading towards the 
back of the van, and so we started removing items 
out of the van. 
-11-
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Q. Was there any time in between that, that you 
were just observing the fire? 
A. I think we stood back a couple of times and 
tried to decide whether or not it was going to 
blow up. (T. 89-92) 
At the close of the Defendant's case, the Plaintiffs moved 
the court for a directed verdict that the Defendant had failed 
to prove any contributory negligence on the part of the Plaintiffs 
and also moved the court to bar defense counsel from arguing 
that the Plaintiffs' failure to have a fire extinguisher consti-
tuted negligence and a cause of the fire: 
MR. MORTENSEN: For the Plaintiffs, I 
would note an exception to the Special Verdict 
form, itself. The Plaintiff will contend that 
there was no evidence to support submitting the 
qu~stion of comparative or contributory negli-
gence to the jury, and, therefore, the issue 
should not be placed before the jury. 
In conjunction with the Special Verdict, 
two Instructions come into effect, and that 
would be Instruction No. 9, being a proximate 
cause instruction, and insofar as it makes refer-
ence to more than one cause being possible, and 
in the second paragraph that should not be appli-
cable to this matter. 
Similarly, Instruction No. 10--well, I'll 
not except to No. 10, because I don't believe 
it's really effective unless No. 9 is applied 
with it. 
As a further statement in support of my 
position with regard tot he Special Verdict, it 
would appear that the only evidence that could 
possibly be argued in the case regarding any con-
tributory negligence on the part of the Plain-
tiff would be regarding the issue raised in the 
trial by defense counse, Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
have a fire extinguisher on tht~ v<)hicl1' dt- Lh(~ 
time. And the Plaintiffs would submit that such 
a matter does not go to contributory or compard--
tive negligence, and it does not go to causation 
and, therefore, should not be submitted to the 
jury. Thqt's all. 
Your Honor, I stated for the record, first 
of all, that I don't think the issue of contribu-
tory negligence should be submitted to the jury. 
THE COURT: You don't think there is an 
issue of any negligence on the part of your peo-
ple? 
MR. MORTENSEN: Right. Along with that, I 
would move the court to instruct the defense 
counsel that he should not argue the issue of 
the lack of a fire extinguisher on the truck as 
relating to the fire, because there is no cause. 
THE COURT: We went over that off the re-
cord last night, I think, and I had some reser-
vations about it. I have some feelings that it 
may be mitigation only. But I think on the basis 
of this kind of loss, which the total damages 
certainly can be attributed to certain various 
acts along the way before the total damage comes 
about and, therefore, the fire extinguisher issue, 
would be an issue that would be, to a degree, a 
legitimate argument in negligence as to at what 
point possible in the total course of the negli-
gence causing the ultimate damage it could have 
been administered, and a portion, or some por-
tion of the total damage that resulted, could 
have been eliminated. 
I think maybe it's a close question, but I 
think it's resolved rather than giving a miti-
gation instruction, there is no way we can give 
a mitigation instruction since the damages have 
been agreed to. 
-13-
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But I think it is a legitimate matter and 
can be handled by both of you in your arguments 
in having it considered as one of the negligent 
acts, if it is considered to be a negligent act 
by the jury that affects some portion of the 
damages, possibly. 
So they will be looking at it from the 
standpoint of it being maybe just another one of 
the elements that ended up in causing the fire. 
What I'm saying, I'm going to allow him to 
argue it. I think there are ways that you can 
also counter it, aside from the basic question 
as to whether it is lack of ordinary and prudent 
care on the part of these people to be out doing 
their work without one in the van. That is a 
very serious question that the jury may feel is 
not negligence at all. 
You certainly cannot allude to any statu-
tory or governmental issues like that, Mr. Hayes. 
MR. HAYES: I understand. (T. 340-342) 
(Emphasis added.) 
The only facts argued by defense counsel during closing 
argument to prove that the Plaintiffs were comparatively negli-
gent were facts relating to the Plaintiffs' failure to have a 
fire extinguisher in the van and the Plaintiffs' company policy 
that fire extinguishers should be placed in each van for safety 
purposes. He argued that a fire extinguisher would have limited 
the fire to the vehicle's engine compartment (T. 394-395). 
Plaintiffs' counsel argued that the Plaintiffs were being 
extra prudent in having policy requiring that fire extinguishers 
be placed in their vans and that under Instruction No. 6 the law 
did not require the Plaintiffs to be extra prudent but only to 
act with reasonable and ordinary prudence. Plaintiffs' counsel 
further argued that the failure to have a fire extinguisher to 
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extinguish the fire could not be a cause of the fin' <lnd, t her•, 
fore, there was no proximate cause attributable to the Plaintiffs 
(T. 397-399). Nevertheless, the jury found the Plaintiffs to l1clve 
been negligent, the Plaintiffs' negligence to have been a cause 
of the fire and the jury apportioned negligence 86% to the Plain-
tiffs and 14% to the Defendants ( T. 403-404 ). 
The evidence offered by the Defendant to prove the Plain-
tiffs guilty of comparative negligence was clearly insufficent to 
allow reasonable minds to conclude that the Plaintiffs had been 
negligent or had contributed to the cause of the fire and the 
court, therefore, erred in submitting the case to the jury. 
While counsel have been unable to find any case directly 
on point, there is a large body of law regarding the legal effect 
of the failure of a plaintiff to use a provided seat belt when 
injured in an automobile accident. The seat belt law is over-
whelmingly to the effect that a plaintiff's failure to use a 
provided seat belt cannot be used to bar his recovery. The de-
fense is not favored for several reasons. First, the failure to 
use a seat belt cannot be said to cause an auto accident. Gibson 
v. Henninger, (Ind. App.) 350 NE2d 631, 92 ALR 3rd 1 (1976). 
Second, the defense invites the jury to speculate as to what in-
juries would have been prevented if the seat belt would have been 
used. Gibson, supra. Fischer v. Moore, 183 Colo. 392, 517 P2d 
458 (1973). Third, the defense would require one who is lawfully 
using the highway to anticipate that another driver may be negli-
gent where, on the contrary, he is entitled to assume that others 
will use due care for his safety. Hampton v. State Highway Comm., 
209 Kan. 565, 498 P2d 236 (1972); Romankewiz v. Black, 16 Mich. 
-15-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
App. 119, 167 NW2d 606 (1969). Fourth, the defense would do 
violence to the standard of care exercised by a reasonably prudent 
man, since at least 75 percent of motorists don't use seat belts. 
McCord v. Green, Dist. Colo. App., 362 A2d 720 (1976). The de-
fense has been rejected by comparative negligence .states as well 
as contributory negligence states. Amend v. Bell, Wash., 570 P2d 
138, 95 ALR 3rd 225 (1977). 
The policy behind the seat belt cases must apply to the 
Plaintiffs' case. First, the Plaintiffs' failure to have a fire 
extinguisher in the van cannot, by any sense of the imagination, 
have been the cause of the fire. Both experts who testified agreed 
that the fire started on top of the engine next to the carburator 
and was of gasoline origin. No one during the trial even hinted 
that the absence of an extinguisher caused the fire. 
Second, the jury in the Plaintiffs' case was invited to 
speculate as to what might have happened had the Plaintiffs had 
a fire extinguisher, had the fire extinguisher worked properly 
and had the fire not have expanded into the interior of the van. 
No expert testimony was offered by the Defendant to show that a 
fire extinguisher would have stopped the fire. The only testimony 
available to the Defendant was the testimony of Mr. Shaw, who had 
never seen a fire extinguisher used, that a fire extinguisher 
might have provided the Plaintiffs a "chance" to stop the fire: 
Q. Did you have the same thoughts at any time? 
A. Well, when I first saw it, I though we could put 
it out. 
Q. Have you ever used a fire extinguisher before? 
A. No, I haven't. 
Q. Have you ever seen one used? 
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A. I'm not sure if I have or not. 
Q. Is it your opinion that if you would have had a 
fire extinguisher, you would have been able to 
put that fire out, initially? 
A. It's hard to say. 
Q. But there's a pretty good chance that you could 
have, though? 
A. Yes, I think we had a chance. (T. 91-92) 
This testimony can only be characterised as speculative. It was 
used in the Defendant's argument to the jury over the Plaintiffs' 
objection (T. 341, 394-395). The jury obviously concluded that 
an extinguisher would have stopped the fire in the engine com-
partment and found, in effect, that 86% of the damage caused was 
the Plaintiffs' fault for not being able to stop the fire. This 
is exactly the type of guess work that was condemned in Gibson and 
Fischer, both supra. 
Third, the defense of failure to have a fire extinguisher 
requires the Plaintiffs to have anticipated that the Defendant 
was going to be negligent and cause their van and equipment to 
burn even though the Plaintiffs did nothing to cause the fire and 
were entitled to assume that the Defendant had replaced the fuel 
filter in a prudent manner. 
Fourth, the defense of failure to have a fire extinguisher 
does violence to the standard of care exercised by a reasonably 
prudent man since there is no evidence that even a small fraction 
of Americans see fit to put a fire extinguisher in every possession 
of value that they own. If this defense is allowed in this case, 
the state of the law will hereafter be as follows: Everyone will 
be required to have a fire extinguisher in his home, his automo-
bile, and everywhere else where he has a "significant" investment. 
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If A negligently starts B's house on fire and B doesn't have a 
fire extinguisher, then B has no cause of action against A if it 
appears that B might have had a "chance" to stop the fire by using 
a fire extinguisher. By the same token, everyone will also be 
required to wear bullet-proof vests, to wear seatbelts, to wear 
parachutes on airplanes, and to avoid driving compact cars which 
could be smashed by a Mack truck. Fischer v. Moore, supra at page 
459. 
Additionally, the law is clear that a company's safety 
rule is not the standard by which its conduct is to be tested, but 
rather the company's conduct is to be limited to the standard of 
reasonable and ordinary care. Waddell v. Crescent Motors, Inc., 
Ala., 69 So2d 414 (1953); Alabama Great Southern R. Co. v. Clark, 
Ala., 34 So 917 ( 1903). In Otto v. Milwaukee Northern Ry Co., 
148 Wis 54, 134 NW 157 (1912), the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated: 
Complaint is made because the court 
admitted in evidence a rule of the company 
for the guidance of its servants, requiring 
them to exercise the highest degree of care 
in handling cars to avoid injuring them-
selves or others. Obviously, that had noth-
ing to do with the case. The law, not any 
rule of the company, was the test of defend-
dant' s duty. Moreover, no such duty as that 
indicated by the rule is legally required as 
regards a mere licensee. Why the trial court 
permitted the introduction of a matter so 
very foreign to the case, is not perceived. 
Moreover, why the illegitimate cha1acter of 
the evidence was intensified by the court, 
upon objection being made, remarking: "I 
cannot see that that does anything more 
than declare what the law would declare 
' but I think I will overrule the objection to 
that." The jury may well have gotten 
therefrom the idea that the law required the 
high standard of care mentioned in the rule 
as regards the personal safety of a mere li-
censee like respondent, which, of course, is 
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not the fact. The court evidently emerged 
from the delusion in that regard before the 
close of the trial since we find the jury wrre 
very emphatically instructed that appellant 
owed the respondent the duty only of exercising 
ordinary care for her personal safety. Whether 
that wholly cured the error so as to render it 
nonprejudicial is not free from difficulty. 
The trial court's allowance of evidence regarding fire ex-
tinguishers and its refusal to limit the Defendant's closing ar-
guement, clearly invited the jury to conclude that the Plaintiffs' 
company policy was to be used as the standard to weigh the Plain-
tiffs' conduct. The jury accepted the court's invitation and 
found the Plaintiffs' 86% negligent even though the jury deter-
mined that the Defendant's negligent repair of the fuel line 
caused the fire~ 
In the seat belt cases, the courts have upheld the trial 
court's exclusion of evidence relating to non-use of available 
seat belts and have upheld the trial court's granting of djrected 
verdicts for the Plaintiffs on the issue of contributory or com-
parative negligence. (See cases cited supra and others in Annota-
tion, Automobil~ Occupant's Failure to use Seat Belt as Contribu-
tory Negligence, 92 ALR 3rd 9~) The trial court in the instant 
case committed reversible error in not excluding evidence regard-
ing the Plaintiffs' failure to have a fire extinguisher and in not 
granting a directed verdict in favor of the Plaintiffs on the issue 
of the Plaintiffs' comparative negligence. Henderson v. Meyer, 
Utah, 533 P2d 290 (1975). 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR 
IN NOT GRANTING THE PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
A NEW TRIAL SINCE THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFI-
CIENT TO JUSTIFY THE JURY'S APPORTIONMENT 
OF 86% OF THE NEGLIGENCE TO THE PLAINTIFFS 
This point assumes, for sake of argument onlj, that some-
how the jury could have found that the Plaintiffs' failure to have 
I 
a fire extinguisher constituted negligence on their part and that 
somehow the jury could have rationally found that the Plaintiffs' 
failure to have a fire extinguisher was a proximate cause of the 
fire. 
It is the Plaintiffs' position that even if the Plaintiffs' 
conduct were somehow a contributing cause of the fire, the Plain-
tiffs' conduct nevertheless played such an insignificant part 
that the jury could not have reasonably concluded from the evi-
dence before it that the Plaintiffs were more at fault than was 
the Defendant. It, therefore, is also the Plaintiffs' position 
that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to grant 
the Plaintiffs' motion for a new trial under Rule 50(a) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which provides in applicable part: 
Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, 
a new trial may be granted to all or 
any of the parties for any of the 
following causes ... 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to 
justify the verdict or other decision, 
or that it is against law. 
The evidence already discussed in Point I will not be re-
cited again except to emphasize that the jury concluded that the 
fire was caused by the Defendant's negligence in servicing the 
fuel filter. Any negligence on the part of the Plaintiffs had, 
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of necessity, to do with their failure to prevent the firo from 
spreading after its cause was first set in motion by the Def en-
dant. The trial court allowed the issue of the Plaintiffs' negli-
gence to be submitted to the jury only on the basis that their 
failure to have a fire extinguisher might have constituted negli-
gence (T. 341-342). The only ground argued to the jury by the 
defense counsel for imputing negligence to the Plaintiffs was 
that the Plaintiffs had failed to have a fire extinguisher in 
the van when it burned (T. 394-396). There was absolutely no com-
petent evidence before the jury to show that a fire extinguisher 
would, in fact, have prevented the fire from spreading even if the 
Plaintiffs' had placed one in their logging unit. 
The evidence was completely insufficient, therefore, to 
support a finding that the Plaintiffs had been equally, or more, 
negligent than had the Defendant, and the trial court abused its 
discretion in not granting a new trial to the Plaintiffs. Holmes 
v. Nelson, 7 U2d 435, 326 P2d 722 (1958). 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR 
IN GRANTING A DIRECTED VERDICT THAT THE 
PLAINTIFFS' HAD FAILED TO PROVE A LOSS OF 
PROFITS. 
At the close of the Plaintiffs' case the Defendant ~noved 
for a directed verdict: 
THE COURT: The record will show the 
jurors have retired from the Courtroom. Mr. 
Hayes, I believe you had a motion to make? 
MR. HAYES: Yes, your Honor. Defendant 
moves at this time, at the close of the plain-
tiffs' case, for a directed verdict based upon 
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the fact that the plaintiffs have failed to 
meet their burden of proof as to any negligence 
on the part of the defendant. That they have 
failed to show by a preponderance of the evi-
dence where men of reasonable minds differ, 
that the defendant was in any way.negligent or 
responsible for the losses that they are claim-
ing. 
With that, the defendant also moves for a 
directed verdict aimed at the portion of the 
claimed damages made by the plaintiff.for lost 
profits or income based upon the facts that 
they have failed to meet their burden of proof, 
showing the formation of a contract that is 
recognized as binding under the laws of the 
State of Utah. 
And we would ask for dismissal of the en-
tire case, or in the alternative, partial dis-
missal of plaintiffs' claims for lost profits 
from the damages they sustained. 
THE COURT: Do you want to be heard, Mr. 
Mortensen? Just the second question is all I'll 
need to hear you on. 
MR. MORTENSEN: Your Honor, I believe we 
have adequately met the burden regarding the lost 
contract damages. Mr. Lewis clearly stated on 
the stand that the job would have been these peo-
ples had they had the unit available. And while 
everybody admits that there was no formal docu-
ments drawn up, I don't believe the law requires 
people to do useless things. And I would just 
submit it with that statement. 
MR. HAYES: May I just make one comment? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. HAYES: To that representation, it's 
not our position that our motion is based upon 
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the lack of formality. We are basing our [11nL ion 
on the lack of a person who was autho1,ized Lo con-
tract. We do not have someone that could cnntr<lcl 
for Amoco who has testified that a contr<lct was 
formed. It just does not reach that at that point, 
and with that we'll submit it. 
THE COURT: The Court will deny your motion 
as to the first request, that is, a directed ver-
dict on negligence. The Court will deny that 
motion, but will grant the second motion as to 
the claim for lost profits on the contracts for 
two reasons: One, as you have stated, no con-
tracting authority having been a party to the 
claimed contract. And the other, I see no way 
that the jury can conclude what the profit on the 
job would have been. So that will be the Ruling 
of the Court (T. 233-235). 
The lower court committed reversible error in granting a 
partial directed verdict against the Plaintiffs since there was 
sufficient evidence before the court that the jury could have rea-
sonably determined that the Plaintiffs had lost profits due to 
the destruction of their logging unit. 
Rule 50(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states 
that a motion for a directed verdict shall state the specific 
ground(s) therefore. The specific ground stated by the Defendant 
regarding the issue of loss of profits was that the Plaintiffs had 
failed to prove their case because they had not produced a~ Amoco 
Minerals officer, who was authorized to sign written agreements, to 
testify that a contract was formed between the parties. The 
court erroneously granted the Defendant's motion on the basis of 
this specific ground. The court, however, in violation of Rule 
SO(a) also granted the motion on the nonstated ground that the 
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court could "see no way that the jury can conclude what the profit 
on the job would have been.'' This action was taken by the court 
even though the Defendant had not by motion disputed that the 
jury could have concluded from testimony given what the Plaintiffs' 
profits would have been. The court's action in granting the mo-
tion on an unstated ground was therefore improper and the unstated 
ground should not be available to sustain the court's action on 
appeal. Mcintyre v. Ajax Mining Company, 20 U 323, 60 P 552 (1899); 
Barlow v. Salt Lake & U. R. Co., 57 U 312, 194 P 665 (1920). 
Nevertheless, the Plaintiffs will address both grounds herein since 
both are without merit in any event. 
In directing ·a verdict, the court must examine the evidence 
in a light most favorable to the party against whom the verdict is 
intended and must determine every controverted fact in his favor. 
Boskovich v. Utah Construction Company, 132 U 387, 259 P2d 885 
(1953). The facts taken most favorable to the Plaintiffs are as 
follows: 
Pursuant to a written invitation to bid sent by Stephen 
Lewis, an Amoco Minerals geologist, the Plaintiffs had bid on a 
logging job offered by Amoco Minerals by using their written 
price list for the Plaintiffs' Mount Sopris logging unit (T. 165, 
198; Ex. 12). Shortly before the date that the van and Mount 
Sopris equipment were destroyed by fire, Philip Canter, the Plain-
tiffs manager, was notified by Lewis that the Plaintiffs had been 
awarded the job, which was to take place in Alzada, Montana (T. 166, 
199-200). The Plaintiffs' van and logging equipment were de-
stroyed several days prior to the performance date of the job and 
prior to the execution of a formal written contract, which custo-
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marily in the industry is done shortly befort' Lhe jot1 ht'qins. 
Canter notified Lewis that the Plaintiffs would not be ilble to 
perform the job because of the loss of the van and logging equip-
ment and Lewis, thereupon, awarded the job to Century Geophysical, 
a logging company which had submitted a bid higher than the Plain-
tiffs (T. 166-168, 200, 215; Ex. 13, 14, 15). In a memorandum 
dated July 2, 1979 to his superior, John B. Squyres, Lewis stated 
that the Plaintiffs had submitted the low bid and had experienced 
operators and reliable equipment (Mount Sopris), but that their 
unit was damaged before project start-up, clearly indicating that 
the job would have been the Plaintiffs but for the fire (Ex. 13). 
Canter contacted Mount Sopris on the next working day 
following the fire and ordered exact replacement of the destroyed 
Mount Sopris equipment lT. 201-202); Although the van was replaced 
within two to three weeks form the date of the fire, Mount Sopris 
was unable to make replacement of the equipment until November 6, 
1979 despite Canter's request for fast delivery. Mount Sopris had 
a three month delivery backlog which was further aggravated by 
its inability to obtain circuit boards for making necessary 
modules (T. 202-203). 
Canter contacted two other manufacturers but he rejected 
using their logging equipment because: (1) they also had a two 
to three month waiting period, (2) their equipment was infer-
ior qualitatively and the Plaintiffs had specifically been awarded 
contracts on the qualitative basis of the Mount Sopris equipment, 
(3) Mount Sopris had a local supplier which could provide better 
service to the Plaintiffs, and (4) the Plaintiffs desired to con-
tinue to use Mount Sopris equipment so that parts could be inter-
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changed from logging unit to logging unit. Canter attempted to 
rent logging equipment pending replacement, but it was not possi-
ble to rent logging equipment (T. 203-205, 219-222; Ex. 11, 13). 
Prior to the date that replacement was made, the Plaintiffs 
were awarded another logging job by Amoco Minerals. The Plain-
tiffs had again been invited to bid by Lewis on the Alzada, Mon-
tana project and again had bid by their standard written price 
list. Again Lewis had called Canter and told him that the Plain-
tiffs had been awarded the contract. However, Canter told Lewis 
that the Plaintiffs' replacement unit had not yet arrived and the 
Plaintiffs could not perform. Lewis then awarded the contract to 
Digilog, a company which again had bid a higher price for its 
logging services than had the Plaintiffs (T. 169-176, 205-208; 
Ex. 12 , 16) . 
Both Lewis and Canter testified that the Amoco Minerals 
job was not performed by the Plaintiffs because the Plaintiffs' 
remaining logging units were all committed and the Plaintiffs had 
not been able to make replacement of the destroyed unit (T. 166, 
173-175, 200, 207, 224-225). Lewis testified that while he was 
not authorized to sign formal written contracts for Amoco Minerals, 
the written contracts would, in fact, have been signed by his 
immediate superior, John Squyres, since neither his nor any other 
geologists' bid recommendation had been rejected by Squyres in the 
two and one-half years that he had worked for Amoco Minerals 
(T. 193). His testimony made clear that the geologists at Amoco 
Minerals have their own budgets and it is the geologists who 
determine which loggers will be awarded jobs (T. 172). Canter 
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testified that in all the occasions in which the Plaintiffs hdd 
been officially contacted and awarded contracts, they had never 
had a contracting company subsequently refuse to enter into a 
formal written contract (T. 216). 
Lewis and Canter both testified that, based upon the Plain-
tiffs' price list, the amount of t~me the jobs involved and the 
number of feet that was actually logged and drifted by the re-
placement logging .companies, the Plaintiffs would have received 
a gross profit from the two contracts of no less than $37,690.40 
(T. 175-182, 209-210; Exhibits 12, 14, 15, 16, 17 1 ). Canter 
testified that additional mileage expenses at 17¢ per mile for 
10,400 miles and additional employee per diem expenses at $700.00 
per unit month for four operating months would have lessened the 
value of the contracts by $4,568.00 leaving a net profit from the 
contracts to the Plaintiffs of $33,122.40 (T. 211-214). 
The evidence as presented was sufficient such that the 
jury could have found that the Plaintiffs would have performed 
the two Amoco Minerals contracts but for the loss of their logging 
unit. The Defendant offered no evidence to dispute the testimony 
of Lewis and Canter, but merely contended that since an employee 
authorized to sign a written contract for Amoco Minerals had not 
testified that both contracts were legally formed, the jury could 
not find that the contract had been formed. The trial court 
erroneously accepted the Defendant's contention and granted par-
tial directed verdict against the Plaintiffs. 
1
copies of these Exhibits are set forth in the Appendix hereto 
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Whether legally binding contracts between Amoco Minerals 
and the Plaintiffs, in fact, came into existence may be argued 
but ultimately and sensibly the point is irrelevant since the key 
issue is: "Would the Plaintiffs have performed the logging for 
Amoco if they would have had a logging unit available?'' Mr. Lewis 
and Mr. Canter both testified that the Plaintiffs would have done 
the logging under both contracts if the Plaintiffs would have had 
a logging unit available. The evidence before the jury was that 
both jobs were orally awarded by Lewis to the Plaintiffs as 
the low bidders and no recommendation by Lewis nor any other 
geologist for Amoco Minerals had ever been rejected by his su-
perior, John Squyres~ Additionally, the Plaintiffs' services were 
so desired at Amoco Minerals that two geologists were competing. to 
get the Plaintiffs available units on their individual projects 
(T. 172). The evidence further showed that in their course of 
business the Plaintiffs had never been notified that they had 
been awarded a contract and then had the contracting company re-
fuse to finalize the agreement via the formality of a written 
contract (T. 193, 216). 
An analogous situation may be found in the law of inter-
ference. Interference with pre-contractual relations is action-
able where a contract would have been entered into had it not been 
for the conduct of the Defendant. 45 Am Jur 2nd, Interference §40 . 
.. . It is not necessary that it be 
absolutely certain that a prospective 
contract would have been entered into 
were it not for the interference. Rea-
sonable assurance thereof in view of all 
the circumstances is sufficient. It is 
sufficient to show that the relationship 
between the plaintiff and another party 
had advanced to the point where the 
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parties intended and were about to 
execute a contract br that negotia-
tions were reasonably certain to 
result in a contract advantageous to 
the Plaintiff. (Ibid.) 
The evidence before the court clearly showed that it was 
more than reasonably certain that the Plaintiffs would have 
entered into and performed two advantageous contracts had their 
logging unit not been destroyed. Therefore, the court erred in 
granting a directed verdict based upon the Defendant's stated 
ground. 
As to the court's unsolicited ground that he could see no 
way that the jury could conclude what the Plaintiffs' profits 
would have been, the evidence again was both clear and sound 
numerically. Nothing was left to guesswork for the jury. The 
evidence was clearly before the jury that the Plaintiffs had ex-
perienced a net loss of profits of at least $33,122.40. 
Plaintiffs' Exhibits 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16 as summar-
ized into a logical calculation by Plaintiffs' Exhibit 17 and 
testified to by both Lewis and Canter clearly showed that the 
Plaintiffs had lost at least $37,690.40 in gross profits. Canter 
testified that expenses of $4,568.00 would have been incurred by 
the Plaintiffs in performing the contracts, leaving a net loss of 
profits of $33,122.40 (T. 175-182, 209-210). Canter testified 
that the expenses deducted would have been additional expenses 
beyond the Plaintiff's normal operating expenses which were in-
curred during the months that the Plaintiffs would have been per-
forming the contracts (T. 211). He testified that no employees 
were laid off after the fire and that no additional employees 
would have been required to perform the contracts had a unit been 
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available (T. 225-226). 
The Plaintiffs' evidence was clear and capable of calcula-
tion. It was so clear that the Defendant did not even move for a 
directed verdict on this ground. However, the Court apparently 
did not grasp the concept that the Plaintiffs were seeking profits 
specifically lost due to their loss of use of a specific logging 
unit since it allowed the Defendant, over the Plaintiffs' objec-
tion, to question Canter regarding the Plaintiffs' gross income 
for the entire year of 1979, a matter clearly irrelevant to how 
much in prof its were lost due to the loss of the two contracts 
(T. 228). 
In Park V. Moorman Mfg. Co., Utah, 241 P2d 914 (1952) at 
page 921, the Utah Supreme Court expressly adopted the rule that 
a Plaintiff may recover for the loss of use of property wrong-
fully destroyed by the Defendant: 
We are in accord with the general 
proposition that where property is 
destroyed the true measure of damages 
is the difference between the market 
value of that property immediately 
before the destruction and its replace-
ment cost, plus its use value until it 
can be replaced within the time re-
quired· of a prudent plaintiff in exer-
cise of his duty to ·mitigate damages, 
less any salvage value of the destroyed 
property. This replacement cost rule 
has been applied in many cases of in-
jury to personal and real property by 
this court. 
Pursuant to this rule of law, the Supreme Court in Park upheld the 
lower court's instruction that the Plaintiff was entitled to dam-
ages equal to the loss of egg production from destroyed chickens 
until replacement of the chickens could be prudently made by the 
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Plaintiffs. 
Park was relied upon by the California Court of Appeals 
in Reynolds v. Bank of American National Trust and Savings Associ-
ation, Cal., 335 P2d 741 (1959). There the court ruled that 
where an airplane is destroyed and not readily replaceable, the 
Plaintiff is entitled to his loss of profits during the period 
reasonably required to make replacement. Directly in point with 
the Plaintiffs' case, the Kansas Supreme Court in Peterson v. 
Bachar, 193 Kan. 161, 392 P2d 853 (1964), ruled that where a motor 
vehicle specially constructed for a specific purpose was destroyed 
and the owner could not immediately obtain a substitute vehicle, 
the Plaintiff was entitled to recover loss of earnings or loss of 
profits provided the calculation could be made with reasonable 
certainty. 
In Park, at page 920, the Utah Supreme Court also stated: 
The fundamental principle of damages 
is to restore the injured party to the 
position he would have been in had it 
not been for the wrong of the other 
party ... Definate rules which will mea-
sure the extent of recovery in all cases 
even of a particular class are difficult 
to formulate owing to the consideration 
which must be given in each case to its 
specific and perhaps peculiar surrounding 
circumstances. Stated in broad terms, 
however, the measure of damages is such 
sum as will compensate the person in-
jured for the loss sustained with the 
least burden to the wrongdoer consistant 
with the idea of fair compensation, and 
with the duty upon the person injured 
to exercise reasonable care to mitigate 
the injury, according to opportunities 
that may fairly be or appear to be within 
his reach ... (empahsis added). 
The Plaintiffs, in the instant case, are in the business 
of logging for the presence of uranium by using a van specially 
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equipped with sophisticated and expensive logging equipment. 
The Plaintiffs make profits by contracting out their logging units 
on a job by job basis. (Pretrial Order, page 3). Jobs are bid 
competitively and the Plaintiffs may bid several contracts at the 
same time (T. 225). 
Taking the Plaintiffs' specific circumstances into account, 
the only fair way to recompense the Plaintiffs for the loss of 
their logging unit is to award them the profits they would have 
received from the two jobs they were awarded by Amoco Minerals, 
but were unable to perform because of the loss of their logging 
unit. There clearly was sufficent evidence before the court to 
allow the jury to conclude that the Plaintiffs had lost over 
$33,000.00 j_n profits because of the loss of their logging unit. 
The court therefore erred in directing a verdict against the 
Plaintiffs on the issue of loss of profits. 
CONCLUSION 
The Plaintiffs proved that the Defendant had negligently 
serviced their logging unit causing it to burn. The Defendant 
failed to prove by substantial competent evidence that the Plain-
tiffs actions had been negligent and a contributing cause of the 
fire. The Plaintiffs' claim for loss of profits was supported by 
substantial evidence and should have been submitted to the jury. 
Therefore, the case should be remanded and judgment entered in 
favor of the Plaintiff for $41,687.95, the damages stipulated to 
for the loss of the logging unit. The Plaintiff should, thereupon, 
be granted a new trial on the issues of the unstipulated damages 
to the van and logging unit and the Plaintiffs' loss of profits. 
In the alternative, the Plaintiffs should be granted a new 
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trial on all issues not stipulated to previously by the parties. 
r~ .-
Respectfully submitted this .J. 0 day of 9.:: ~ , 1982. 
/Z/d/-"'./) I -~· 2i /'/~--L--;z:,~~ 
PAUL W. MORTENSEN 
Attorney for Plaintiffs-Appellants 
~c{~) 
Attorney for Plaintiffs-Appellants 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed two (2) true and exact 
copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to Nelson L. Hayes, 
counsel for the Defendant-Respondant, RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & 
NELSON, P.O. Box 2465, Salt Lake city, Utah 84110, dated this 
/{[></./.. day of ~ ' 1982. 
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APPENDIX 
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,61( VI/ I~ ·V~IY-';'''' 
t\L~lJLVG FIELD SERVICES ~lk-&i1CJ /},;/ 
Co""T~v 
4UO 31 ~ ltoad • (;raucl Jamel ion, Coloraclo 0150 I • (303) 2.13.4 l 12 
April 1, 1979 
x:x_J-f- ,t~+Price list - Mount Sopris Model 3000 Loggers 
Equipment is four-channel and mounted in four-wheel drive vehicle. 
STANDARD BASIS: $4,650 per month + footage. 
Includes 200 hours per month. On location standby and 
logging hours recorded, only. Hours over 200 charged 
$35.00 each. No charge for mileage, drive time, per 
diem or regular days off. Additional charge of $350 per 
month applicable to drift services. 
Footage Rates: 
Natural gamma, S-P, single point resistance .... $.07/ft. 
Gamma, S-P, Resistance, normal resistivity .... $.08/ft. 
Ganma, S-P, Resistance, Neutron ......•........ $.10/ft. 
Gamma, resistance, ganma-garrma, caliper .••..... $.10/ft. 
Digitized gamma (print) ..................•..... $.10/ft. 
Borehole deviation (digitized+ computed) ...•.. $.05/ft. 
CALL OUT BASIS: 
Hourly (On-location only) •..........•••... $35.00/hr. 
Mileage (roundtrip) ....................... $ .30/mile. 
Footage .•.•....•.•..•....•.....•.•...•.... As above. 
Deviation •......•....•••........•....•.... $35.00/day. 
f 1 
LOSS CHARGES: 
NOTE: 
; 
Probes: 
i 
Gamma, S-P, Resistance, Resistivity ..... $3700 
Gamma, S-P, Resistance, Neutron ......... $7500 
Gamma, Res· is ta nee, gamma-gamma , cal i per.$ 7 250 
Drift .•........••.•................. · .... $9250 
Cable damage or loss .................... $ .70/ft. 
Client is responsible for downhole loss of any probe or 
radioactive tools. Repairs will be made by the client 
at current repair or replacement prices. Above costs 
are estimated. 
Temperature, acoustic velocity, induced polarization, 
magnetic susceptibility, three-arm caliper, magnetic tape 
and other logs available. Prices subject to change at 
any time. 6!18------. ; PLAINTIFF'S 1 E,XHIB 
J 
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1 ,', 
--r~-~ .... -~~~u~.~~ y (;J~(Jl 'JI YS I (~A I~.-..;< )J {I'() J { /\ 'r I ()N 
£650 E. Apache/Tulsa, Oklahoma 74115 
Phone 918/838-9811 
Amoco Minerals Co. INVOICE DA TE 7-31-79 
Suite 508, eee W. Hampden Ave. 
Englewood, C080110 Contract #01 
Dated June 29, 79 
INVOICE NO. 7996 
CLIENT NO. c 7-37 
OlSCAll'TION 
. -, 
.. 
.. ••, 
• ·"!'.:._ 
\. 
~;. 
#,/ 
. 
HOLE LOGGING SERVICES - Alzada - July, 1979 
Basic Rate $3950/mo 
Deviometer: $750/mo 
Footage Chg: 28,302' 
Overtime: 7.4 hr 
Neutron: 28,302' 
Deviation: 28,210' 
Per Diem: 23/da 
( 1..~ '; 
I. . ... . J - ... :·. .. I . () i.F . . ~ I 7.'f I 
. l ), . 
I. " ·\, , .. ~ . ( . l 
.. k 0r l J'. i_/ !·:' .. 
{ . _,,,,,, 
!/ / 
.. 
,. 
x.09/ft 
x l8.29hr 
x.02/ft 
x. 06/ft 
x $30/da 
' / I I '~ 
I' 1···' 
. l I I I\~ 
l ~· ~' 
~· 
!¢ '\, 
. ~; . r.3/tc/17 0> DATE _...:--...:--Ji.--
$3,950.00 
750.00 
2,547. 18 
1.2 162.42 
566.04 
l,692.60 
690 .. 00 
$10>358.24 
/(J.17,, 
~ 
-. ·:~d.tG /9<;-;Y 
·/. rl - / 
.I 
'/ 
~(vQ;;. •. · SENT TO CHICAGO 
<v'\·: . DATE RECEIVED: 8--/n 79 . . . ' l 
--!K-'..~~~~--....--i .-{...) APFRDV~D FUR PAY~ENT 
MfdH PRiM SEC S?EC 
----· .,--
/' I. 
D'F "'~0~ 1 ~'T · J._. ti:i; Uli 17"~ 
Jo,l'Jf .. 6 2- 0 t 
RVtCE.S PERFORMED IN COUNTY, 
t PARTY 
04 MT. 
~ 
• PLAINTIFF'S · 
J E~J)T ~5 L\ 
I • 
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Amoco Minerals Co. Contract #1, Dated June 29,INVOICE DATE 
1979 Suite 508 . 
West Hampton Ave. 
E~glewood, CO 80110 
INVOICE NO. 
CLIENT NO. 
OICSCAIPTION 
1E HOL£ LOCCINQ SERVICES -
Basic Rate: 
Devi ornete r: 
Foot.age Chg: 
Neutron: 
Deviation: 
Per Diem: 
iERVICE.S PERFORMED IN 
JR PARTY 
01 
Alzada - August, 1979 
_ ... ./ 
$3950/mo 
· $750/mo 
3978' 
3978' 
5561' 
6/da 
x 25% 
x 25% 
x.09/ft 
x.02/ft 
x.06/ft 
x $30/da 
DA TE REC £PIED·_ --'--...:..=....-~?fL----7/--: 
APPRO'f£D FOR PAYMEHT BY·u.;_ ... ~~- ~ MA1~ PRIM SEC SPEC #AI. ~ 
-
COUNTY, 
~ PLAINTIFF'S 
MT. 
.EXHI IT I 
·s-Jl-79 
8089.· 
c 8-10 
AUOVHT 
$987.50 
l 87. 50 
358.02 
79.56 
333.66 
180.00 
$2,126.24 
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l • ....... • •' .' ,. • • ' .. ,' • li!iAUil 
AMOCO MINERALS COMPANY 
First National Bank Building 
333 West Hampden, Suite 508 
Englewood, CO 80110 
~ttn: Steve Lewis 
s~~ 
• - . ~ • .., ( -- ,.._ - - .... r-· ., - - ' 
. . I . ' . I I ' ... ' I .. 
• . . ' ' I ' 
. . . . . -- .. - .. -- - --. . - -· I ' 
' f I •~' '( J : 
I J '( I· 't 
•,I II'-•. r ,,..7• )'•'• 
·.,· ..•. -• \,.; .. ~ :·1· 
:.!•' ~-'-' ·--· .;:· 
f •I \ / t'. t 
. . r' • . • 
............ ·-·~-- --· ··-~ J•t; 
• • . .! • ~ • ~ .. ' '· - ; • 
. . .... . . .. . ... ···' -- ...... .. --- · ... 
INVOICE No· NO 0196 Oa;e: 1~-30-79 
Project Date: 1 0 I 3 0 -1 1 I 3 1I7 9 
location: J\ 1 z ada , MT 
Customer P.O. No.: 
Job Number: 38 • 01 
Unit Number: 
Terms: Net 15 days Date Due: Dec 15, 1979 
Service Performed 
Monthly Term Fee 
Footage: 
gamma, SP, Res, Neutron 
Drift Tool rental 
Per Diem 
Overtime No charge for extra hours 
for· 11/2,11/5,11/6,11/21 
Unit 
1 
34,209' 
26,724' 
1 mo 
23 days 
32.75 
Price Total 
$3950.00 
.10 3420.90 
.08 .- 2137.92 
500.00 
35.00 805.00 
35.00 1146.25 
n/c 
n/c 
r 
... . . . . . .. '- ...... ~~~~sc Pa/f'rorn This Invoice "'"' ·· · t· 
~ecJ.5j OJ{6) ,:.,;-..1 (c',. -·~ 71- Jt 8 - l/'10 
J.f?G.'fb M('Jotal amount du6').\<v 
·-----~ (}... l\ ' 
---------• PLAINTIFF'S 
11 - Jig - '/Yo $11,960.0 
-- ,.-)~---
cf;- //:5 
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7001 \\'l-st 117&.J' /vtt~ue !',ut.= Ge 
~Yocnll ··~· CoiY1 IC to OClJ20 
::aJ) 466-7309 
AMOCO MINERALS COMPANY 
• I • f • , •• 
I ~ ! : • I~- \ •• 
·:, t • • 
. . . . ' . 
• • • . • ... •• • 1"' 
I Nvo I CE No: NQ 0201.~~ 
First National Bank Building 
333 West Hampden, Su~te sou 
Englewood, CO 80110 
. O ate : 1 2 - 3 1 - 7 9 i;.~ 
Project Date: 12/1 - 1 2/7 /7 9 ;':e 
location: Al zada, MT · ·::~w1 
Customer P.O. No.: 
Job Number: 38.01 
Unit Number: D-6, D-5 ~1 
~: 
Terms: Net 15 Days Date Due: January 15, 1980 
Service Performed 
Progress Billing 
Term Fee: 
Footage: gamma, SP, Res, Neutron 
rerun 
deviation survey 
Note: this is a progress billing, term 
fee, per diem, and any overtime 
will be billed at end of project 
Unit 
25,877' 
55' 
16,623' 
Price Total 
• 1 0 s 2587. 70 
.08 4. 4 o::i 
.08 1329.84~ 
: 
(/l. /£0 
D~ ,TE ______ ..,....--
Sc :~r ln CHlCAGC i n J a n u a r y L ·. ·:- :- r r '"' • • · • - ,1 ~'I  . I 
, t I • • .• "' : • • • '//"I B c 
n. ~.. -· - .. -• • --' •-,__----~------+---f _. ..... ··--; --·-- - . . ·- . } . // j u d 
. : < .. ~. ~ ~ ... ~ ~- ~ j . ~ ·~ : . : ~ ~ ~ i ~:;: { 1_ .(. t {-( /.. ~ .f. . .Pt : 
"' 
' 
tt l 
.... 
. ~ ' " 
'••I 
E. Bfcx.k 
/J/, fioc h-
4-0/,?. 0 
3S-2-D.74 
......___ .... 
F ~ · ~, t: :-'· ~' 1 r ... ·' '"'· · ·· ~ "· · ~ ~ ' r '=- [ 'l ~ i' · '· 1 T J, 
a ••• ~:.l f.: .• ;, v ... : t;.·~1_, i.:.~ L U;a .. ~1;·;J,b )t1·/J, \~ 
'J '17 / --_ · j [, £- ._ fi4 · (2. -- '/ o /. ~ o "v(') <. .. ~ ... 
'/ 't 71 - } £. 6 - '-I 'I ? ) >- Jc. 7 'f c;Co) \ '·, 
Please Pay From This Invoice 
~e Payment Rec'd ------------
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-~; 
I\ AMOCO MINERALS COMPANY 
First National Building 
333 West Hampden, Suite 508 
Englewood, CO 80110 
Terms: Net 15 · day.s Date Due: 
.. Service Performed 
1-23-80 
' INVOICE ~:;e:Ngs-ao 02os 
Project Date: Dec 1 - Jan 1, 198 0 
Location: Alzada, Montana 
Customer P.O. No.: 
Job Number: 38.01 
Unit Number: D-5, D-6 
Unit Price Total 
[(1.,-------------------------t-------+---------"-----~ 
1: 
Term fee ( 2 trucks w/operators) 
Footage: gamma, SP, R, Neutron 
rerun 
deviation survey 
wireline 
Drift tool rental 
JI Per diem 
Overtime no charge for extra hours on 
12/14,12/15,12/20,12/22 
Mi le age no charge 
footage charged on invoice 201 
for 12/1 - 12/7 is not included on 
i note: 
I 
1 
2 s 3950.00 s 
52,217' .... • 1 0 
808' I • 08 
37,906' . ·.: .. '· • 08 - I ~'~ 4,785' . .-..,,t. .05 ,,. 
-1 ~ ?X 
unit ':J 
43 days 35.00 
96.5 hr~ 35.00 
.. ~ .... 
this invoice !/t.,/-:,c 
1 r!'"·~ ... ;··-:i -.-...... -.... /' 11.~ !e 0 DATE . . . - -~ i~~u~~"i.:j: ______ ,_:..>_..~ '---.;;... _____ ~ SENT lo :HlChG~ ,,. 
,, ... \ ~ 
'.. . \ \ 
. \ .. 
l,.., ... " • 
I ., ,•-1 r:~·1•:••••7 
·\J··.:.~; i• . . .1, ........ .. 
- • - \J.& .,: ••• :. •••• 
,.-~.,~ 
.. ·. ( .. , I I •••• c--~") ~;· .... _, 
~·::: &J ,£.!t_'1~-" /J.J~A.:·~T 
r 
.. .~ :.~ ·:·l. f ·: 1: ~:·;·rr.«a~ Pay From This Invoice i .. ~;. ~d l: .. v.,;&tl "")ttlJ't -
~- ,.L. 
~ <' .. 
,; . . " 
.#(.' .•• I-·· 
7900.00 
5221.70 
64.64 
-303.~·~ 4B 
239.25 
500.00 
1505.00 
3377.50 
n/c 
. ~ .. ---
- 1~:.11..Z't oJ(B)total amount this invoice ... $ :~,8~~-~-
/ S-11 .5 L o ',(c-) ('. 61 o .Jr .,.. I .5 I 2.. • S" 1 l_1-,-1-,-7-"/-~-. -</)--' 
--..... --
'-:Jl.B - '!'lo 
1- J(, 8 - 'f lf 0 
w. f31C¥k 1f( 2 :31-. }./f j 
I 
'1rc Payment Rec'd 
-----------
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ACCULOG FIELD SERVICES 
480 31~ Road • Grand Junction, Colorado 81501 
Date 
Project:Alzada, Mont. 
Basis: Monthly 
Client:AMOCO Minerals 
Daily Fee Reg OT 
ly 1979 $4650.00 
-
-totals 
-
~ls 
. INVOICE 
Feet Miles Drift 
28,302 - $350.00 
x.10 
$2830.20 
~ PLAINTIFF'S .. 
! i?T· 
• (303) 243-4112 
Period Ending: 
Invoice Date: 
Due By: 
Exp 1 a nation 
Drift Footage 
28,210 
x.05 
$1410.50 
Totals 
Daily $4650.00 
8a;etat:iffle 2830.20 
Fee~a§e 350.00 
~4i l cage 1410.50 
Grand Total: $9240. 70 
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ACCULOG FIELD SERVICES 
480 3 l Y.t Road • Grand Junction, Colorado 81501 • (303) 243-4112 
M** 
Project: INVOICE Period Ending: r'r~ · r, ·~, 
Basis: Invoice Date: ;:1 
Due By: 
Date Oa i ly Fee Reg OT Feet Miles Drift Explanation 
~ 
Drift Footage 
:\ug 1979 $4650.00 3978 $87.50 5561 
x.25 x.10 x.05 
I! 
$1162.25 $397.80 $278.05 
-
Totals 
,-
:b-totals Daily $1162.25 
Overti1t1e 397.80 
J=eeta§e 87.50 
Mn ea§e 278.05 
-
--
.,a 1 s Grand Total: $1925 .60 
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ACCULOG FIELD SERVICES 
480 31~ Road • Grand Junction, Colorado 81501 • (303) 243-4112 
•,' ,.., 'I I '' • ' ' I , ' • • '• ~ t ·, t o es•• AF W11™'' ...,. swaw • •,, I 1,• •I, •,',,, '\ 
1 1
1 ,II ttt t • I.I 
Project: INVOICE Period Ending: 
Basis: Invoice Date: 
Due By: 
)ate Daily Fee Reg OT Feet Mil es Drift Explanation 
' 
- Drift Footage 
'I 1979 $4650.00 34,209 $350.00 26,724 
x.10 x x.05 
$3420.90 $1336.20 
Totals 
)- totals Daily $4650.00 
Overti~e 3420.90 
Feeta§e 350.00 
Mn ea~s 1336.20 
-
:al s Grand Tota 1: $975 7. 1 O 
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ACCULOG FIELD SERVICES 
480 31 Y.i Road • Grand Junction, Colorado 81501 • (303) 2434112 
AP* 
,,.,.,.,. a 
Project: INVOICE Period Ending: 
Basis: Invoice Date: Due By: 
Date Daily Fee Reg OT Feet Mil es Drift Exp l a na ti on 
-
Drift Footage 
Dec 1979 $9300.00 52,217 $350 ._00 37,906 
(2 Trucks) x.10 x.05 
$5221.70 $1895.30 
I 
( 
-
Totals 
Sub-totals Daily $9300.00 
Qye~~~~e 5221.70 
r.:ee~a~e 3 50. 00 
~H ~ ea~e 1895.30 
Totals Grand Total : $16, 767 .oo 
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